Causation
A causal claim states what would happen if one variable were changed. An association alone rarely justifies such a claim.
The counterfactual idea
To say that a treatment caused an improvement is to compare what happened with the treatment with what would have happened to the same person without it.
Each person has two potential outcomes, and the causal effect for that person is the difference between them (Rubin, 1974). Only one can ever be observed; the other is the counterfactual. An average effect can nevertheless be estimated when the treated and untreated groups are comparable, which randomisation ensures.
Causal diagrams
A causal diagram, or directed acyclic graph (DAG), represents each variable as a point and each assumed causal effect as an arrow (Greenland et al., 1999). Association passes along any unblocked path between two variables, whatever the direction of the arrows. Four structures account for most differences between association and causation.
- Confounding: a fork, X ← C → Y
- A common cause associates its effects. Age, for example, reduces grey-matter volume and slows reaction times. Comparing people of the same age blocks the path.
- Reverse causation, X ← Y
- The outcome causes the exposure, as when the undiagnosed early stage of a condition reduces physical activity.
- Mediation: a chain, X → M → Y
- The exposure acts through an intermediate step. Adjusting for the mediator removes part of the effect being studied.
- A collider, X → S ← Y
- Two variables both cause a third. Selecting on the collider, or adjusting for it, creates an association that does not exist in the population (Cole et al., 2010). Berkson’s bias in hospital samples is an example.
Collider bias
In the simulation, an anxiety score and a memory-problem score are independent, and people are referred to a memory clinic when their sum is high. Among referred patients the two scores are negatively correlated, because those with little anxiety must have had marked memory problems to be referred.
Randomisation
When people choose their own treatment, those who receive it usually differ from those who do not, and these differences can explain a difference in outcomes. Random allocation breaks this link: every characteristic, measured or not, is expected to be balanced between the groups, and any imbalance is due to chance, which the statistical analysis allows for.
A trial also needs a control group, which differs only in not receiving the treatment, and often a placebo, an inactive treatment that looks the same. Expectation alone can have biological effects: in people with Parkinson’s disease, a placebo was followed by a substantial release of dopamine in the striatum (de la Fuente-Fernández et al., 2001). Blinding keeps participants, clinicians and assessors unaware of who received what, and allocation concealment prevents those enrolling participants from predicting the next allocation (Schulz et al., 2010).
Experimental manipulation in neuroscience
Functional MRI and EEG record which brain regions are active during a task, but activity can accompany a behaviour without being needed for it. To test whether a region is necessary or sufficient, neuroscientists change its activity and measure the consequences.
- Lesions
- Damaging a region and observing what is lost. Rats with hippocampal lesions were impaired at finding a hidden platform (Morris et al., 1982).
- Optogenetics
- Neurons are made to express light-sensitive proteins such as channelrhodopsin-2, so that light makes them fire with millisecond precision (Boyden et al., 2005) or, with other proteins, silences them.
- Drugs
- Agonists activate a receptor and antagonists block it. Few drugs act on only one target, so specificity must be shown.
- Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
- A magnetic pulse through the scalp induces currents in the cortex (Barker et al., 1985), briefly exciting or disrupting a region in healthy volunteers. Sham stimulation is the usual control.
When experiments are not possible
Many causal questions cannot be answered by randomising people, for example questions about head injury or genotype. Quasi-experimental designs use features of the world that act like randomisation; each is persuasive only when its assumptions are plausible (Craig et al., 2017).
- Instrumental variables and Mendelian randomisation
- An instrument influences the exposure, affects the outcome only through it, and is unrelated to confounders. In Mendelian randomisation the instrument is a genetic variant, inherited essentially by chance (Davey Smith and Ebrahim, 2003). A variant may, however, affect the outcome by other routes (pleiotropy).
- Difference-in-differences
- The change over time in an exposed group is compared with the change in an unexposed group, assuming that both would otherwise have changed in parallel (Dimick and Ryan, 2014).
- Regression discontinuity
- When treatment is given to everyone above a cut-off score, people just either side are similar, so a jump in outcomes at the cut-off estimates the effect (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
The Bradford Hill considerations
Bradford Hill described nine aspects of an association to weigh before judging it causal, and stressed that none is decisive on its own (Hill, 1965). The exception is temporality: a cause must precede its effect (Rothman and Greenland, 2005).
| Consideration | Meaning | Limitation |
|---|---|---|
| Strength | A strong association is harder to explain by confounding. | Weak associations can be causal, and strong ones confounded. |
| Consistency | The association is seen repeatedly, in different places and designs. | Studies can share the same bias. |
| Specificity | The exposure is linked to one outcome rather than many. | Many causes have many effects. |
| Temporality | The cause comes before the effect. | Essential, but hard to establish when a disease begins long before diagnosis. |
| Biological gradient | More exposure goes with more of the outcome. | Some effects have thresholds, and confounders can produce gradients. |
| Plausibility | A credible mechanism exists. | It depends on current knowledge. |
| Coherence | The causal interpretation does not conflict with what is known. | Absence of conflict is weak evidence. |
| Experiment | Changing the exposure changes the outcome. | The experiment may test a different question. |
| Analogy | Similar causes are known to have similar effects. | Analogies can be found for almost anything. |
Assessing a causal claim: smoking and Parkinson’s disease
The claim that smoking protects against Parkinson’s disease shows how a causal claim is assessed. Smoking causes many serious diseases; nothing here suggests that anyone should smoke.
The association
A meta-analysis of 44 case–control and 4 cohort studies found a relative risk of 0.59 (95% CI 0.54 to 0.63) for people who had ever smoked and 0.39 (0.32 to 0.47) for current smokers, compared with people who had never smoked, and the risk fell with each additional 10 pack-years (Hernán et al., 2002). The association is strong, consistent and graded, and unlikely to be due to chance.
Alternative explanations
Parkinson’s disease begins years before diagnosis, and its early changes might make people less inclined to smoke (reverse causation). Smokers also die earlier of other causes, before a diagnosis can be made (survivorship bias).
Experimental evidence
In a randomised, placebo-controlled trial, 163 people with recently diagnosed Parkinson’s disease wore nicotine or placebo patches for a year. Nicotine did not slow progression (Oertel et al., 2023).
Conclusion
The trial tested progression, not onset, and one component of tobacco, so whether smoking affects the risk of developing the disease remains open. A fair summary is: “strongly associated; causal explanation not established”.
References
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